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Serving in the Master’s House: Legal Protection  
for In-Home Care Workers in the United States 
Richard Michael Fischl∗ 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Labor stories. – 3. The emerging law of in-home care work: 
Three initiatives. – 4. Evaluating the initiatives. – 5. References. – Appendices. 
1. Introduction
This essay will focus on the developing forms of legal protection available in the
United States to those whose principal place of work is another person’s home and 
who are paid to do what is broadly referred to as “care work.” 1 The particular 
services vary widely – from housecleaning, to child care, to companionship and 
routine health care management for the elderly and the infirm – but the labor 
market demographics do not: This is low-wage/no-benefit work performed almost 
exclusively by women and primarily by women of color and of extra-national origin 
(Blackett, 2011; Boris, Klein, 2015; Markkanen, Quinn, Sama, 2015). 
* The author wishes to thank participants in the Thirteenth International Conference in
Commemoration of Marco Biagi for their thoughtful and encouraging reactions to an early 
draft; Jon Bauer, Bethany Berger, John Cogan, Miguel de Figueiredo, Peter Kochenburger, 
Molly Land, Tom Morawetz, Sachin Pandya, and Steve Utz for criticisms and suggestions 
offered during an enormously helpful faculty workshop; Renee Gerni and Jennifer Hunter for 
much-needed assistance in understanding the “view from the ground” in care worker 
organizing and representation efforts; and Mairead O’Reilly (Class of 2016) and Reference 
Librarian Extraordinaire Anne Rajotte for first-rate research. 
1 For a perceptive explication of what counts as “care work” in in-home as well as 
institutionalized settings, see Duffy, Armenia, Stacey (2015).  
Reprinted from Employment Relations and Transformation of the Enterprise in 
the Global Economy (Edoardo Ales, Francesco Basenghi, William Bromwich, & 
Iacopo Senatori, eds.) (Giappichelli, Turin) (2016), with permission graciously 
provided by the publisher.
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At first blush, this may seem like an odd topic for a collection devoted, in the 
words of the original call for papers, to “the transformation of the enterprise in 
the global economy” and to phenomena such as “geographically extensive value 
chains” and the emancipation of the firm “from any commitment to a particular 
location.” But I am struck by the relevance of the developments under 
consideration – italicized below and once again quoting the call for papers – to 
the challenges that have long been faced by those engaged in the necessarily local 
and profoundly personal provision of in-home care work in the US: 
• The “evolution of the organisational framework” of the enterprise: The 
“outsourcing” of care work has deep roots in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries – when families of means commonly employed 
domestic servants – but during the past fifty years the phenomenon 
has increasingly become a feature of life in the middle class, the 
working class, and among the poor, as the provision of caring services 
has shifted dramatically from the family to a mix of market alternatives 
(where family resources permit) and state supported services (where 
they do not) (Duffy, 2015). 
• The “problems arising from the identification of the employer in 
relations between a plurality of actors” and the resulting “need to 
define the legal position of the actors involved in this plurality of 
relations”: In the in-home care context, the players include individual 
workers; organizations that represent them (principally labor unions 
and worker centers) as well as those representing various cohorts of 
care recipients (e.g., AARP for the beneficiaries of elder care); 
private third-party placement firms; and state and national 
governments, which fund and to a lesser extent otherwise regulate 
much of this work (Boris and Klein, 2015). In the context of this 
“plurality of actors,” an emerging issue of central importance is the 
identity of the “employer” when the state pays the tab but the 
immediate beneficiary of services “hires” and directs the work 
performance of the individual provider. 
• The “assimilation between small business owners and self-employed 
workers” facing “asymmetrical power relationships” and a “lack of 
protective measures”: Here too there is an important analog from in-
home care work and particularly in the context of family child care, 
where services are frequently provided by individuals and small 
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enterprises treated as independent contractors and thus beyond the 
protective scope of most US labor and employment law. 
• The “fragmentary” legal and institutional responses to the challenges 
faced by such workers via hard law (e.g., the application of wage and 
hour law to domestic workers), soft law (e.g., union– and state-
maintained registries for matching the would-be beneficiaries of care 
with qualified and trained home care providers), and no law at all (or 
so it almost invariably seems at the common law baseline). 
In sum, “[h]ome care’s past prefigured the future[,]” anticipating by decades 
many of the legal challenges faced by workers in the so-called “new economy” 
(Boris, Klein, 2015, 15). 
There is a further important link between in-home care work and the topics 
addressed in this collection. The economic and organizational trends under 
examination – the continued dismantling of internal labor markets, the relentless 
outsourcing of services (via labor contractors) and production lines (via supply 
chains), and the nigh giddy erasure of the local – conspire to create a world of 
precarious employment and variable work-scheduling practices in which it is 
increasingly difficult, economically as well as logistically, for a family to “care for 
its own.” These developments thus account for much of the recent dramatic 
growth in the in-home care work industry (Boris, Klein, 2015), which growth in 
turn makes it possible for those with significant caring responsibilities – a labor 
market cohort still quite nearly as gendered as that of the outsourced version – to 
participate in the brave new world of work. 
The essay proceeds thus. In Part I, I explore the historical exclusion of in-
home care workers from legal protection with a pair of labor stories. The first is 
an account of the role of “domestic servants” in the development of the common 
law of employment and the eventual though decidedly partial displacement of 
common law by statute. In the beginning confined to persons quite literally 
engaged in the provision of “domestic” (i.e., household) services, during the late 
nineteenth century the category became the default status for those working the 
underside of the then-emerging employment relation – not for nothing was it 
called master/servant law – and in that form defined those entitled to protection 
under modern labor and employment legislation. Yet in a twist that continues to 
complicate their plight, the “pioneers” in the field of abject personal service were 
left behind in the legislative reform efforts of the twentieth Century, though, 
contrary to what has become the conventional wisdom, their exclusion from those 
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efforts began not with the New Deal but decades earlier as states enacted the first 
generation of workers compensation laws. 
The second story is an account drawn from my own experience as a labor 
lawyer litigating cases about the legal rights of confidential secretaries – a class of 
workers whose responsibilities are in a variety of ways the white-collar analog to 
what domestic workers do in the home – an experience that offers a telling 
glimpse into the values and assumptions that animate the resistance to legal 
protection for both groups to this day. 
Part II turns to contemporary efforts in the US to improve the legal lot of 
those who provide in-home care work, exploring initiatives at both state and 
federal levels to extend wage-and-hour protection to live-in domestic workers as 
well as to providers of companionship services for the elderly and the disabled; to 
protect the interests of in-home workers engaged in the provision of a wide 
variety of care services via the state-by-state enactment of a “Bill of Rights for 
Domestic Workers”; and to designate in-home care workers whose compensation 
is provided by public funding as “employees” of the state – or of a state-created 
institutional proxy – for purposes of collective bargaining over wages and other 
salient issues, notwithstanding the fact that some key incidents of traditional 
employer prerogative (e.g., hiring, firing, and directing the provision of services) 
are exercised primarily by the beneficiaries of care or their families. 
Part III examines the promise and perils of the respective initiatives. The 
model of “constructing” an employment relationship for collective bargaining 
purposes seems particularly well-suited (again in the words of the call for papers) 
for “counter[ing] the trend towards the individualization of interests and the 
decline in solidarity among workers,” while the wage-and-hour and “bill of 
rights” initiatives present the same enforcement difficulties faced by most 
individual-rights regimes and especially those providing protections for low-wage 
workers. Yet on closer examination, these individual-rights initiatives likewise 
reveal a critical solidaristic dimension in the campaigns to enact them as well as 
efforts to secure their enforcement, as labor unions and worker centers deploy 
rights-based innovations to organize and otherwise advance the interests of in-
home care workers. At the same time, success on the collective-bargaining front is 
threatened by a pattern of retrenchment at the state level and also by a recent 
Supreme Court decision that just could not find its way past understandings of 
the employment relation traceable to nineteenth-century master-servant law. 
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2. Labor stories 
2.1. Another look at the legal history of “domestic servants” 
Unlike the poor, the modern conception of the employment relation has not 
always been with us. Well into the nineteenth century, American jurists 
understood and organized the world of work in much the same way they 
organized the rest of what we think of today as “contract law” – i.e., as discrete 
bodies of legal doctrine governing the respective “relations between landlord and 
tenant, guardian and ward, master and servant, and also relations of factors, 
brokers, corporations, and so on, in a manner analogous to the way they had been 
treated by Blackstone” (Orren, 1991, 61-62; Gilmore, 1974). According to the 
conventional wisdom, a central feature of US legal development during the latter 
part of the century was the shift “from status to contract” – i.e., the shedding of 
such feudal remnants in favor of a regime in which the parties to all manner of 
relationships freely and mutually constructed their terms of engagement in the 
shadow of a unified body of largely facilitative contract law. 
Whatever historical truth this narrative might hold in other contexts, the 
recent work of legal historian Christopher Tomlins has persuasively made the case 
that the story was otherwise for the American working class in the late nineteenth 
century – that during this era “‘employees’become ‘servants,’ not vice versa” 
(Tomlins, 2011, 355-56) and the wide variety of work relationships previously 
governed by a potpourri of discrete regimes were absorbed into a single jural 
category, “master and servant,” a category reserved in the earlier period for use in 
the context of household service (Tomlins, 1993). Tomlins argues that the 
conventional “status to contract” narrative has obscured this latter development 
and that “by concentrating upon the loosening of the bonds of explicit servitude 
– apprenticeship, indentured servitude, and eventually slavery – we have ignored 
the changes, the tightenings, in the social and legal meaning of employment” that 
occurred during this era as well (Tomlins, 2011, 356). In keeping with its roots in 
domestic service, the master-servant relationship that emerged as the default 
status for all forms of employment “had a necessary authoritarian component 
distinguishing [it] from other kinds of contracts: The employer was entitled not 
only to receipt of the services contracted for in their entirety prior to payment but 
also to the obedience of the employee in the process of rendering them” 
(Tomlins, 1993, 279-80; Orren, 1991). In other words, employees – working in a 
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wide variety of institutional settings – were the new servants, domesticated, if not 
domestic, since they “gave at the office” (or, more often, the factory, mill, mine, 
shipyard, or farm) instead of in the master’s house. 
At least in broad outline, the conventional wisdom has the next chapter in the 
story right – i.e., the partial displacement of master/servant law by a flurry of 
labor and employment legislation enacted during the twentieth century. But there 
is a profoundly ironic twist rendered visible by the light Tomlins sheds on the 
provenance of the common law baseline: In statute after reformist statute, the 
workers whose legal status had come to define the employment relation – and 
thus the boundaries of what the legislative flurry sought to reform – were left 
outside the protective sweep of the emerging body of law. Existing histories of 
how domestic servants came to find themselves on the cutting room floor, written 
without the benefit of the insights offered by Tomlins, miss this dimension of the 
story entirely. 
Because of their focus on the key federal statutes of the New Deal era – the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Social 
Security Act – those histories miss a second dimension of the domestic servant 
saga as well. To be sure, they rightly note that the express exclusion of domestic 
servants from each of those statutes went hand-in-hand with an exclusion for 
agricultural workers and that the two occupational cohorts had several telling 
characteristics in common. For one thing, in the New Deal era there were doubts 
as to whether the federal power to regulate “interstate commerce” could reach 
workers involved in the provision of such intensely local services as household 
and farm work, and the exclusions may thus have been driven in some measure by 
the drafters’desire to ensure that the legislation would survive constitutional 
review. Regional economic interests may have also played a role, given the 
centrality of low-wage agricultural and domestic work to the Southern economy 
and the prominence of representatives from the region in the New Deal 
congressional coalition. The accommodation of an uglier but related regional 
interest loomed large as well, for in the 1930s the excluded occupational cohorts 
were the source of employment for nearly two-thirds of African-American 
workers. 2 Although the matter is not without controversy (DeWitt, 2010; Leroy, 
 
 
2 In 1930, 36.1% of African-Americans were employed in agriculture and 28.6% were 
employed in domestic and personal service. United States Department of Commerce 1930, 
Statistical abstract of the United States, Washington, 75 tab. 2.  
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Hicks, 1999; Linder, 1987) – and virtually all concerned acknowledge the 
surprising paucity of reference to, let alone controversy about, the subject 
exclusions in the legislative history of these statutes – an unholy trinity of 
constitutional caution, regional economic interest, and Southern racial 
domination has thus become the standard account of how domestic servants and 
farmworkers found themselves on the outside looking in during the New Deal era 
(DeWitt, 2010; Palmer, 1995; Perea, 2011). 
Yet none of the existing histories acknowledge a pattern of exclusionary 
practice that pre-dates the New Deal legislation by a quarter century and is 
difficult to attribute to the historical forces associated with the standard account. 
Thus, between 1910 and 1920, forty-three of what were then forty-eight states 
enacted workers’compensation (WC) statutes, requiring or enabling employers 
within their jurisdictions to insure their employees against workplace injuries and 
occupational disease. 3 As it happens, all but six of those states excluded domestic 
servants from statutory coverage. 4 Although some jurisdictions did so by negative 
implication – typically, by limiting statutory protection to a specific list of 
hazardous occupations that did not include domestic service – most states defined 
WC coverage more broadly and expressly excluded domestic servants. 5 Like the 
 
 
3 See Appendix I: State-by-State Treatment of Domestic and Agricultural Workers Under 
Workers Compensation Laws, infra. By 1935, three of the five hold-out states had adopted 
WC statutes (North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida), and the remaining two enacted 
statutes in 1939 (Arkansas) and 1948 (Mississippi). See id. (The US did not have 50 states until 
1959, when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the union.) 
4 The statutes adopted by New Jersey, Maryland, Iowa, and Pennsylvania seemingly 
covered domestic servants. The statutes adopted by Ohio and Connecticut had no specific 
exclusion for domestic servants but governed only those employers with five or more 
employees, thus excluding domestic servants working in most US households. The other 37 
states excluded all domestic servants from statutory coverage. (Appendix 1.)  
5 Twenty-three states enacted statutes with express exclusions for domestic workers, and 14 
states did so by negative implication (Appendix I, note 1). New York – which enacted the first 
WC statute in the country in 1910 and played a leading role in the development of WC 
principles in the US (Witt 2004) – provided a template for both approaches. In the 1910 
statute, New York took the negative implication approach and provided coverage for a list of 
specific jobs (e.g., bridge building and demolition, scaffolding work) “determined to be 
especially dangerous, in which from the nature, conditions or means of prosecution of the 
work therein, extraordinary risks to the life and limb of workmen engaged therein are inherent, 
necessary or substantially unavoidable ...,” and domestic servants were not on that list (1910 
N.Y. Laws 1945 § 215). Most of the states enacting statutes at the beginning of the decade 
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New Deal statutes enacted two decades later, virtually all of the jurisdictions 
excluding domestic workers excluded agricultural laborers as well. 6 Significantly 
for our purposes, the “early adopters” – of WC generally and of the exclusions 
for domestic and farm workers in particular – were northern and western states, 
and the holdouts, which did not enact WC until a decade or two later, were all 
from the deep South. 7 
The nigh uniform exclusion of the familiar occupational cohorts from the 
emerging body of WC law could not plausibly have been a product of 
constitutional caution (since these developments took place at the state level, 
where concerns about the reach of the federal commerce power would not have 
come into play) or of a triumph of Southern economic and racial policies (since 
the practices in question originated in northern and western states and spread to 
the South). Rather, the state-level exclusionary practices seem far more likely to 
have been driven by the contemporaneous understanding of the problems the 
WC statutes were designed to address – i.e., the dramatically increasing incidence 
of death and injury flowing from industrial accidents and the barriers to recovery 
for same posed by late nineteenth-century tort law (such as the negligence 
standard and the fellow-servant rule) (Witt, 2004). The factory – rather than the 
home or the farm – was thus the original focus of the remedial efforts, and it is 
not a surprise that classes of workers not exposed to the hazards of industrial 
production found themselves on the outside of reformist efforts. 
Yet the WC developments also suggest that it is a mistake to treat the forces 
driving the respective exclusions for domestic servants and agricultural workers as 
historically linked in every respect. On the agriculture side, for example, there is 
 
 
took a similar approach, excluding domestics by negative implication (Appendix I). In 1913, 
New York amended its statute and “flipped the default,” broadly defining prima facie WC 
coverage and providing specific exclusions, domestic servants among them (1913 N.Y. Laws 
2277). The overwhelming majority of states that adopted WC laws after 1913 adopted this 
latter approach (Appendix I). 
6 Except in the cases of Vermont and Delaware – where the WC statutes contained express 
exclusions for domestic servants but no exclusion for agricultural workers – every other state 
treated agricultural workers in the same manner as domestic servants, excluding both cohorts 
(either expressly or by negative implication) or including both (Appendix I, note 2). 
7 See Appendix I and note 3, supra; see also Witt 2004, p. 18 (“southern states tended to be 
laggards in the development of work-accident law reform, following paths charted by northern 
states”). 
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evidence of organized opposition by farm interests to the inclusion of their 
workers in state WC schemes (Fishback, Kantor, 2000, 108), while there is no 
evidence of a similar effort among the employers of domestic servants. At the 
same time, John Fabian Witt’s magnificent study of the history of WC reveals the 
deeply patriarchal nature of the ideological lenses through which late nineteenth– 
and early twentieth-century lawmakers viewed the problem of industrial accidents 
and may thus suggest an independent basis for the treatment of domestic 
servants. As Witt observes, “[t]he central preoccupation of those who sought to 
address the industrial-accident crisis was injury to the male wage earner with a 
dependent wife and children[,]” and “this model of the family—the so-called 
family wage—played an influential role in the development of the American law 
of accidents” (Witt 2004, 19-20). The statutes in question were, after all, originally 
denominated “workmen’s” or “workingmen’s” compensation laws, and the 
“gender specificity [was] no coincidence” (Witt 2004, 20). To take but one telling 
example, under the express terms of the New York WC statute, which became a 
model in this respect and many others for a majority of the “early adopters” of 
WC, recovery for the death of a worker was available for a dependent “widow or 
next of kin,” and – as interpreted by the courts – “widowers were neither next of 
kin nor widows” and thus not entitled to statutory compensation for the death of 
a working wife (pp. 132-33). The erasure of working women that otherwise 
characterizes so much of this body of law would go a long way to explain why 
women’s work would likewise find itself on the cutting room floor, and make no 
mistake about the gendered nature of contemporaneous domestic service, since 
the workforce in question was overwhelmingly female and the work was by some 
distance the most common source of paid employment for American women. 8 
There is neither the time nor the space here to undertake anything like a 
complete history of these developments and their implications for what I have 
referred to as the standard account of the domestic servant and agricultural 
 
 
8 According to the 1930 US Census figures, women comprised 82% of those classified as 
“servants,” including both “cooks” and “other servants,” employed in domestic rather than 
institutional settings (such as hotels and boarding houses). United States Department of 
Commerce 1930, tab. 49 (reporting that women comprised 371,095 out of 565,392 total cooks 
and 1,263,864 out of 1,433,741 total other servants). Moreover, nearly 30% of “gainful[ly]” 
employed women worked in “domestic and personal service,” half again as many as those who 
worked in either manufacturing or clerical jobs and twice as many as those who worked in 
professional positions, principally teachers and nurses. Id. at 55 tab. 48, 63 tab. 49. 
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worker exclusions, but two additional observations are in order. First, my focus 
on gender in the genesis of the exclusion for domestics should not be read to 
preclude the operation of a racial dimension as well. The racial politics of the 
New Deal are well documented, and, as noted earlier, together the domestic and 
farm labor exclusions covered nearly two-thirds of African-Americans in paid 
employment in the US, a devastating racial impact difficult to ascribe to mere 
oversight. While the “too much collateral damage” argument raised by some to 
challenge the racial domination narrative – i.e., the claim that race could not have 
been a factor since the majority of US workers adversely impacted by the 
domestic and farm labor exclusions were white (DeWitt, 2010) – may have some 
force in the context of agriculture (where over 70% of the workers were indeed 
native whites), the argument is less convincing in the context of domestics (where 
native whites made up just over a third of the workforce, nearly half were African-
American, and most of the rest were foreign born). 9 
The case for a racial dimension in the development of WC is more difficult to 
make, since there were few African-Americans in the early adopting states before 
the first wave of northern migration coinciding with World War I (Witt, 2004). 
Yet the story offered thus far may well help to account for the “dog that did not 
bark” in the legislative history of the New Deal statutes. Thus, against the 
backdrop of a longstanding and widespread state-level practice of excluding 
domestic and farm labor from the protections of workplace regulation, adopting 
the same exclusions in the New Deal context might well have appeared to 
representatives from even the most progressive and otherwise worker friendly 
northern states to be unremarkable and merely business as usual. 10 It would not 
 
 
9 Among domestic servants in 1930, 555,761 (36%) were native white; 264,167 (17%) were 
foreign-born white; 714,630 (46%) were African-American; and 27,224 (2%) were “other,” a 
classification that included “Mexicans, Indians, Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Hindus, Koreans, 
Hawaiians, etc.” United States Department of Commerce 1930, 85 tab. 3 (combined figures 
under “Domestic and personal service—Servants” for “Cooks” and “Other servants” apart 
from those working in “Hotels, restaurants, boarding houses, etc.”). For the corresponding 
figures in agriculture, see id. at 75 tab. 2. 
10 Buttressing this inference is the fact that a similar developmental pattern is evident 
among the states that took the lead in enacting unemployment insurance statutes and did so 
before the scheme was “federalized” by the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. 
Following the approach taken by Wisconsin, which passed the nation’s first unemployment 
insurance act in 1931, a majority of those states likewise adopted express domestic servant and 
agricultural worker exclusions, and once again the exclusionary pattern had its genesis in 
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have been the first time, nor was it to be the last, that a failure to “remember the 
ladies” would be business as usual for American lawmakers. 
2.2. Confidential secretaries, in-home care work, and the gender connection 
For a half decade between law school and law teaching, I worked as an 
appellate lawyer for the National Labor Relations Board, and most of my cases 
involved efforts by the agency to secure reinstatement and backpay for employees 
fired for union organizing and (in the language of the National Labor Relations 
Act) “other concerted activities for the purpose of … mutual aid or protection.” 11 
In what eventually became my “career” case – in the sense that it was with me 
from my first day on the job until the day I departed, as well as in the sense that I 
have been writing about the case ever since I joined the academy – the general 
manager of an electric power company in rural Indiana fired his long-time 
personal secretary because she had signed a petition protesting the dismissal of a 
fellow employee who suffered the loss of an arm as a result an on-the-job injury. 12 
There was no serious question that the signing of the petition by the secretary and 
most of the firm’s other employees was “concerted activity for the purpose of . . . 
mutual aid or protection” nor that the manager had fired her because of her role 
in the protest; indeed, her signature was prominently displayed John Hancock-
style among the names immediately following the text of the petition, and her 
boss abruptly dismissed her the first opportunity he had after receiving the 
offending document. But a complication lay in the firm’s claim that she was a 
“confidential employee” outside the scope of statutory protection because of her 
service as personal secretary to the firm’s general manager. 
The details of the treatment of confidential employees under the Labor Act 
need not detain us; in a nutshell, employees who provide confidential assistance 
to management officials in the exercise of labor relations responsibilities are 
deemed ineligible for inclusion in a bargaining unit of other employees and are 
arguably excluded altogether from the Act’s protection. Ordinarily, the personal 
secretary to a firm’s general manager would easily fit that definition, but the 
 
 
northern and western states. (Appendix II: Unemployment Insurance Statutes Enacted before 
Enactment of Social Security Act of 1935 (8/14/35), infra). 
11 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
12 NLRB v. Hendricks County REMC, 454 U.S. 170 (1981). 
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record in the case revealed that the manager in question had handled the firm’s 
labor relations matters with the assistance of outside counsel and did not share 
the correspondence, working documents, and the like with his secretary, keeping 
the pertinent materials in a locked file behind his desk. As the Labor Board and 
the reviewing courts noted, this was an unusual arrangement, but the small-town 
rural context as well as the fierce sense of solidarity among the firm’s employees 
evident in the offending petition may well have prompted the manager to avoid 
sharing the firm’s labor relations plans and strategies with an employee who was 
otherwise by all accounts a most capable and efficient personal assistant. 
Three months out of law school, the case seemed like a slam-dunk to me, for 
the facts were not seriously in dispute, and the equities strongly favored an 
employee heartlessly fired for taking a courageous but respectful stand to defend 
a disabled colleague. The firm’s only plausible argument was that employees with 
access to confidential information of any kind – not just confidential labor matters 
– should be treated as “confidential employees,” and there was dictum in a then-
recent Supreme Court opinion supporting that view. Yet such an expansion 
would have upended four decades of labor law and abruptly denied collective 
bargaining rights to all manner of professional and other white-collar workers – 
and to many blue– and pink-collar workers whose tasks made them privy to 
employer secrets – so the policy calculus seemed strongly in our favor as well. 
Nevertheless, the grown-ups at the agency were deeply concerned about our 
prospects, and when I pressed them to explain the source of their doubts, the best 
anyone could do was to proclaim that the personal secretary to a firm’s general 
manager just had to be a confidential employee, and no amount of conscientious 
fact-finding and careful parsing of the applicable legal test could avoid what they 
saw as this basic and undeniable truth. 
As was so often the case in those early days of practice, the grown-ups were 
right, for I managed to lose the case not once but twice in the federal court of 
appeals before the slimmest of Supreme Court majorities came to the rescue of 
the courageous secretary. The oral arguments at the appellate level were 
excruciating exercises, with judge after judge pressing various versions of the 
point that the general manager’s personal secretary just had to be a confidential 
employee and dismissing my best efforts to demonstrate that, on this record, this 
manager had carefully kept this secretary out of this loop when it came to labor 
matters. I am slow but not stupid and thus began to sense that something more 
was going on here, and the big reveal came at the moment a kindly senior judge 
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on one of the panels interrupted my presentation to ask, “Counsel, don’t you see 
that union rights are awfully hard to swallow when you’re talking about 
someone’s personal secretary? It would be like . . . like union rights for your 
wife!” 
At the time, I had neither a personal secretary nor a wife, and, though I adored 
and greatly admired my father, it occurred to me that there was no person on 
earth who might benefit more from union representation than my mother, who 
raised six children and ran a household without a net or, for that matter, a 
domestic servant. Why then, I wanted to ask, were legal rights for either wives or 
personal secretaries so unthinkable? Yet I had been permitted a glimpse of what I 
came eventually to think of as the hidden topography of American labor law – the 
values and assumptions, in James Atleson’s elegant phrasing, that run so deep in 
legal decision making they scarcely need explaining let alone defending (Atleson, 
1983). And what were the values and assumptions I had encountered among my 
senior colleagues at the NLRB and so many of the federal judges who heard the 
secretary’s case? Simply this: that the power and prerogatives of the beneficiary of 
intimate services were of greater moment than the needs and interests of the 
provider, and that the loyal provision of such services was incompatible with the 
notion of countervailing rights or the law’s intrusion. It is no coincidence that the 
work in question was women’s work, and if the confidential secretary was the 
proxy wife in the workplace, then the domestic servant is very much the proxy 
wife in the home. Once you understand that, the rest of the way US law has 
traditionally treated in-home care work begins to make sense. 
3. The emerging law of in-home care work: Three initiatives 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, there was a second wave of workplace 
legislation, including the key antidiscrimination laws associated with the Civil 
Rights era (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967) as well as “minimum standards” regulation such as the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 (OHSA). Yet domestic servants once 
again found themselves on the outside of reformist efforts, expressly excluded 
from OSHA coverage and gaining little traction on the antidiscrimination front, 
since the statutes in question establish jurisdictional thresholds (e.g., Title VII 
governs employers with 15 or more employees) the staff at Downton Abbey might 
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satisfy, but that leave most workers in domestic service without federal coverage. 
The first sign of hope came in the mid-1970s by way of an important change to 
the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act – more about that in a moment – 
and the past two decades have seen the emergence of three ambitious initiatives 
that have had varying degrees of success and geographical dispersion: the 
extension of federal and state wage-and-hour protection to workers who provide 
companionship and/or live-in care for the elderly, the infirm, and the disabled; 
the state-by-state enactment of a “Bill of Rights for Domestic Workers” designed 
to protect the interests of care workers providing a wide variety of in-home 
services; and the designation of in-home care workers whose compensation is 
provided by public funding as “employees” of the state – or of a state-created 
institutional proxy – for purposes of collective bargaining over wages and other 
salient issues. The sections that follow offer a closer look at each of these 
initiatives. 
3.1. Wage and hour law: The companionship and live-in exemptions for elder and 
other in-home care work 
Since the New Deal, US wage and hour law has been governed in the first 
instance by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which establishes a federally 
mandated minimum hourly wage as well as a mandatory time-and-a-half overtime 
premium for work in excess of 40 hours per week. Individual states may and 
frequently do establish higher minimums and overtime premiums for employers 
operating within their borders and also with some frequency extend state 
coverage to workers excluded from the protection of the federal statute. 13 
As mentioned earlier, domestic servants were by terms excluded from the 
original text of the FLSA, but in 1974 Congress amended the statute to end that 
exclusion and cover a wide swath of workers providing cooking, cleaning, child 
care, and other household services. Statutory exemption was continued, however, 
 
 
13 The current federal minimum wage – established in 2009 – is $7.25/hour, but 29 states as 
well as the District of Columbia have established higher minima, the highest of which are the 
District (at $10.50) and the states of California and Massachusetts (at $10.00). See United 
States Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Minimum Wage Laws in the States – 
Consolidated State Minimum Wage Update Table (Effective Date: 1 January 2016), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm. [Accessed 24 January 2016.] 
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for “live-in” domestic servants as well as providers of “companionship” services 
for the elderly, the infirm, and the disabled. In the language of the sponsors of the 
1974 legislation, the latter exemption was designed for those who would keep 
their charges company and ensure their basic safety and well-being even if those 
services included “incidental” personal care and household work, such as 
preparing an occasional meal or light washing and cleaning. To police the line 
between exempt companions and the larger class of newly covered domestic 
workers, the Department of Labor early on established a rule that eliminated the 
companionship exemption for those whose performance of such “incidental 
services” exceeded 20% of the weekly hours worked. 14 
In a world in which most such care was provided by family – which is to say by 
wives, daughters, and daughters-in-law – the companionship exemption no doubt 
seemed like a sensible effort to avoid “making a federal case” out of relatively 
minor gap-filling services offered by neighbors, fellow parishioners, and the 
occasional “sitter.” But a series of developments during the final decades of the 
twentieth century conspired to transform the nature and institutional dimensions 
of elder and other in-home care in the US, including: 
• an aging population; 
• the increasing “medicalization” of elder care (from blood-pressure 
monitoring to medication management to other paramedical tasks); 
• the decline in institutionalized forms of elder and other care in favor of 
in-home services; 
• the decline of the family wage and the entry into the labor market of 
large numbers of women who had previously provided elder and other 
care in their so-called “spare time”; 
• the expansion of Medicaid funding for long-term home care services; 
• and (prompted in no small part by the availability of public funding) 
the dramatic rise of third-party home care agencies, which today 
employ nearly three-quarters of those providing elder and other care 
services in the recipients’homes. 
(Boris, Klein, 2015; Duffy, Armenia, Stacey, 2015.) Indeed, in-home health 
care is the fastest growing occupational cohort in the US (Duffy, 2015). 
Responding to these and related developments, 19 states and the District of 
 
 
14 The history of this legislation is set forth in Home Care Association v. Weil, 799 F.3d 
1084 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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Columbia (D.C.) have adopted various forms of wage-and-hour coverage for 
companionship and live-in service providers. For example, with minor variations, 
California, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, and D.C. extend minimum wage 
protections to persons otherwise subject to the FLSA companionship exemption. 
All but North Dakota and Ohio likewise extend overtime protections to such 
workers, and all but Nevada and Washington eliminate the live-in exemption. 
Again with minor variations, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, 
Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin likewise provide wage-and-hour 
protection to FLSA companions – and, except in Michigan, extend such 
protection to live-in workers as well – but they limit coverage to those hired by 
third-party agencies and retain the FLSA exemption for those companions hired 
directly by families. 15 
On the federal side, on January 1, 2016, the Department of Labor under 
President Obama implemented regulations making important changes in the 
interpretation and enforcement of the companionship and live-in exemptions: 
• First, the regulations sharply narrow the definition of “companionship 
services” to “fellowship” and “protection,” which include activities 
such as playing cards, visiting with friends and neighbors, and taking 
walks, but do not include personal care services (such as bathing and 
feeding), minor medical care, or general household services (meal 
preparation, cleaning, and so on). Accordingly, if the latter efforts 
constitute 20% or more of the individual’s weekly work, the 
companionship exemption does not apply. 
• Second – and following the lead of a number of the aforementioned 
states – the regulations limit both the companionship and live-in 
exemptions to those engaged directly by the care beneficiary or her 




15 Paywizard.org, (2016). Minimum Wage Provisions Home Care Aides – Federal and 
per State. [online] Available at: http://www.paywizard.org/main/salary/minimum-wage/ 
home-care-aides; id., Overtime Pay Provisions Home Care Aides – Federal and per State. 
[online] Available at: http://www.paywizard.org/main/salary/labor-law/overtime-pay/ 
home-care-aides  
16 http://www.dol.gov/whd/homecare/faq.htm.  
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Once again, the FLSA establishes the wage-and-hour “floor” beneath which 
states may not go, and accordingly these new regulations can be expected to have 
a sweeping effect on the 31 states that have not adopted legislation protecting 
companionship and live-in service providers. 17 
Turning to the question of enforcement, on the federal side there are public 
and private avenues for relief against employers who violate minimum wage and 
overtime provisions. The Wage and Hour Division of the US Department of 
Labor has the authority to investigate violations – either on its own initiative or in 
response to a complaint – and to secure a range of remedies from the restoration 
of unpaid wages to civil and criminal penalties. 18 For willful and repeat offenders, 
civil fines of up to $1,100 may be imposed for each violation; criminal prosecution 
may result in fines of up to $10,000 and, for a second conviction, imprisonment. 19 
Private rights vindication is also available in the form of individual lawsuits as 
well as “collective actions” under by the FLSA. The statute also authorizes 
recovery of unpaid wages as well as liquidated damages calculated at twice that 
amount plus reasonable attorneys’fees, but punitive damages are unavailable. 
Because the potential recovery for an individual low-wage worker is ordinarily too 
meager to make litigation viable, the statute authorizes “collective actions” that 
enable multiple claimants to aggregate their claims against an employer. These 
actions differ from the traditional class action in at least one significant respect: a 
class-action plaintiff’s representation of similarly situated claimants is presumed 
unless and until they “opt out” of the proceeding, but, in order to benefit from an 
FLSA collective action, an individual claimant must affirmatively “opt in” by 
filing a consent-to-join forms with the court. (Ruan, 2012.) 
Employers none too happy with “whistleblowers” – employees who initiate or 
participate in proceedings alleging wage and hour violations – are nonetheless 
prohibited from discharging or engaging in any other retaliation against them. A 
variety of remedies are available when they do, including lost wages as well as 
compensatory damages, equitable relief such as reinstatement, and reasonable 
 
 
17 As this essay was going to press, an effort by third-party agency representatives to enjoin 
enforcement of these new regulations was rejected in a carefully reasoned opinion issued by a 
unanimous three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Home Care 
Association v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
18 http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs44.htm. [Accessed 24 January 2016.] 
19 http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/mwposter.htm. [Accessed 24 January 2016.] 
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attorneys fees. 20 Although the question is not settled, there is also authority for an 
award of punitive damages in FLSA retaliation cases. 21 
At the state level, the specifics vary but most jurisdictions provide public as 
well as private enforcement options that at least in broad outline track the federal 
model. The most notable recent development on this front is the enactment of 
“wage theft prevention acts” by well over a dozen states and D.C., virtually all of 
which require employers to provide detailed and accurate pay rate information to 
employees upon hire and over the course of their employment, with the dual 
purpose of incentivizing employer compliance through transparency and at the 
same time easing the evidentiary burden on employees who pursue claims. Other 
common provisions include substantially increased penalties for wage and hour 
violations, enhanced protections against whistleblower retaliation, and augmented 
judicial powers (such as the freezing of assets) for securing compliance with 
remedial orders. (Boris, Jokela, Undén, 2015; Dasse, 2014; Weisbard, Leonard, 
2015.) 
3.2. The “Bill of Rights for Domestic Workers” movement 
The current decade has seen the enactment of a “Bill of Rights for Domestic 
Workers” (BOR) in a half dozen states. The movement began with New York in 
2010, 22 and it subsequently spread to Hawaii, 23 California, 24 Massachusetts, 25 
Connecticut, 26 and Oregon; 27 as this went to press, a bill was under consideration 
 
 
20 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
21 See, e.g., Shea v. Galaxie Lumber, 152 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998). 
22 New York Domestic Workers Law 2010, 13A N.Y. Prac., Employment Law in New 
York § 7:263 (2d ed.) (2015). 
23 Act 248, 2013 Session, §§ 1-2, amending Hawai’i Revised Statutes §§ 378-1 and 378-2, 
available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2013/bills/GM1351_.PDF. [Accessed 24 
January 2016.] 
24 Cal. Lab. Code § 1450 et seq. (2014).  
25 Massachusetts General Laws 149 §§ 190, 191 et seq. (2015).  
26 An Act Concerning Service and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 
2015 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 15-249 (S.B. 446) (WEST). 
27 Employment Protections for Domestic Workers, Oregon Statutes, Ch. 457, § 1 (2015). 
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in a seventh jurisdiction as well. 28 Who counts as a legally protected “domestic 
worker” varies by state. Oregon’s law, for example, covers nannies, house 
cleaners, and housekeepers in private homes but excludes home care workers, 
who have collective bargaining rights as discussed in the next section of the essay. 
Connecticut’s law, by contrast, covers home care workers as well as other 
domestics, but its reach is limited to households with three or more employees. 
The specific “rights” at issue likewise vary. Apart from Connecticut, each of 
the states extends to domestic workers the protections of minimum wage and 
overtime law. On the wage and hour front, Hawaii adds the right to be paid at 
least twice a month, and Massachusetts adds a guarantee of two weeks’severance 
pay in the event of termination without cause. 
With the exception of California, each of the states provides protection against 
sexual, racial, and other forms of harassment. Connecticut and Oregon add 
protections against discrimination in hiring and firing, and Connecticut’s law 
further provides a right to a reasonable leave of absence for a disability resulting 
from a pregnancy. Hawaii’s original bill contained hiring discrimination 
provisions as well, but – in what has become a familiar pattern in the US when 
antidiscrimination efforts meet claims of religious freedom – the provisions were 
reportedly scrapped after “religious groups in the state … expressed concern that 
employers would not be allowed to fire people who work in their home but 
espouse different religious views or attempt to indoctrinate children with their 
religious views” (Bapat, 2013). 
Other rights include a weekly “day of rest” (Hawaii, Massachusetts, New 
York, and Oregon); the right to daily sleep, rest, and meal breaks (Massachusetts 
and Oregon); a right to cook personal meals on the employer’s premises 
(Oregon); and a right to privacy in connection with such personal activities as 
making phone calls (Massachusetts). 
In terms of enforcement, the principal effect of these statutes was to eliminate 
the exclusion of domestic workers from existing wage and hour and 
antidiscrimination laws, and thus domestic workers now have recourse to the 
same mix of public and private remedial options enjoyed by employees in other 
occupations. Hawaii offers a unique enforcement innovation through its Office of 
 
 
28 Illinois Domestic Worker Bill of Rights 2013 (SB 1708), available at http://www.ilga.gov/ 
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=1708&GAID=12&DocTypeID=SB&SessionID=85&GA
=98. [Accessed 24 January 2016.] 
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Community Services (OCS), established specifically for the purpose of assisting 
“low-income, immigrant, and refugee populations to overcome and alleviate 
workforce barriers to economic self-sufficiency through an array of community-
based programs and services.” 29 The OCS has contracted with non-profit 
immigrant resource centers in four locations throughout the state to provide a 
variety of services to the target populations, including assistance to domestic 
workers in learning about the rights afforded them by the Hawaii BOR and in 
availing themselves of its protection. 30 
3.3. Bargaining in the shadow of the state 
3.3.1. Collective representation for home care workers 
Since the late 1990s, home care workers – who provide in-home services to the 
elderly, the disabled, and the infirm through Medicaid funded state-run programs 
– have secured the right to bargain collectively with public authorities in ten 
states: California, 31 Connecticut, 32 Illinois, 33 Maryland, 34 Massachusetts, 35 
Minnesota, 36 Missouri, 37 Oregon, 38 Vermont, 39 and Washington. 40 Home care 
workers initially secured bargaining rights in several additional states but 
subsequently lost those rights as a result of political developments discussed in 
Part III of the essay. Yet this is a growing and sizeable workforce, and the 




29 http://labor.hawaii.gov/ocs/.  
30 http://labor.hawaii.gov/domestic-workers-rights/ .  
31 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 12301.6 (1999). 
32 Conn. Gen Stats. §§ 17b-706 (2012). 
33 Ill. Compiled Stats. § 2405/3 (2003). 
34 Md. Code, Health—General §§ 15-901 to 15-907 (2011). 
35 Mass. Gen. Laws 118E §§ 70-75 (2006). 
36 Minn. Stats. § 179A.54 (2013). 
37 Missouri Rev’d Stats. §§ 208.850-208.871 (2008). 
38 Ore. Rev’d Statutes §§ 410.595-410.625 (2001). 
39 21 Vt. Stats. §§ 1631-1644 (2013). 
40 Wash. Rev’d Code § 74.39A.270 (2004). 
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Early efforts to organize for purposes of bargaining with state program 
administrators over wages and other benefits foundered on the objection that 
home care workers were “really” the employees of the individual care recipients 
and their families rather than of the state. (As it happens, that argument has 
recently captured the fancy of a majority of US Supreme Court Justices, and more 
on that too in Part III.) In the 1990s, the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) – collaborating with disability, consumer, and senior citizen organizations 
– secured passage of legislation in California requiring the establishment of 
county-level public authorities that would serve as “employers of record” for 
home care workers providing services through California’s In-Home Support 
Services program. (Boris, Klein, 2015.) Thus originated the idea of creating an 
“employer” via state law that could engage in collective bargaining with a labor 
organization representing individual providers, and versions of this model have 
been successfully employed to enable collective bargaining by home care workers 
in each of the states listed above. What follows is a description of the mechanics 
of the model as well as the results of a decade and a half of collective bargaining 
in the shadow of the state. 
• The path to bargaining rights: Bargaining rights for home care workers 
were in each case the product of efforts by a union-led political 
coalition that frequently included organizations representing care 
beneficiaries and consumer groups, but the particular means used to 
secure the requisite legal authority differed by jurisdiction. In Oregon, 
Washington, and Missouri, the rights were established via public 
referendum. In Illinois, Maryland, and Connecticut, bargaining rights 
were initially secured by an executive order issued by the state’s 
governor, and in each case the rights were subsequently codified by 
statute. In the remaining states, bargaining rights were secured in the 
first instance through the legislature. 
• The employer-side bargaining representative: Bargaining in California 
continues to operate on a county-by-county basis, but every other 
jurisdiction has established or designated a state-wide bargaining 
entity. In some states, the entity is a commission created entirely for 
this purpose (e.g., the “Home Care Commission” in Oregon and the 
“Personal Care Attendant Quality Home Care Workforce Council” in 
Massachusetts); in other states, the union representing home care 
workers bargains directly with representatives of an existing state 
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office (such as the governor in Washington and the departmental 
program administrators in Maryland). 
• The employee-side bargaining representative: Following the approach 
used in the US for both private and public sector collective bargaining, 
elections are authorized in each state to determine whether a majority 
of the home care workers desires union representation. In California, 
the elections were conducted at the county level, and various SEIU, 
AFSCME, and other union locals have won representative status in 55 
of the state’s 58 counties. The other states required state-wide 
elections, resulting in representative status for the SEIU in 
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, and 
Washington; for AFSCME in Maryland and Vermont; and for a joint 
SEIU/AFSCME local in Missouri. 
The gains established in collective bargaining likewise vary by state, but a 
number of discernible patterns have emerged. First and foremost, the contracts in 
all ten jurisdictions establish wage rates that substantially exceed existing 
minimum-wage levels. In the State of Washington, for example, under the current 
collective contract, wages range from $11.50/hour at the entry-level to $15.65 for 
workers with substantial experience and training. 41 Oregon has a starting wage of 
$13.75; 42 and Massachusetts recently agreed to a $15/hour starting wage effective 
in 2018. 43 Other benefits frequently contracted for are health insurance, including 
dental and vision; 44 workers compensation coverage; 45 on-the-job health and 
safety protection (such as state-provided masks, exam gloves, and hand sani-
tizer); 46 transportation benefits (including passes for public transportation and 
 
 
41 Collective Bargaining Agreement: The State of Washington and Service Employees 
International Union Healthcare 775NW, Effective July 1, 2015, Through June 30, 2017 (Washington 
Agreement) at A-2, available at http://ofm.wa.gov/labor/agreements/15-17/nse_homecare.pdf.  
42 2013-2015 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Home Care Commission and 
Service Employees International Union, Local 503, OPEU (Oregon Agreement) at 19-20, 
available at http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/CHRO/docs/lr/13_15_SEIU-HCC_final.pdf.  
43 See http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/newsroom/press-releases/eohhs/baker-administration 
-negotiates-new-contract-pca.html.  
44 See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 18; Washington Agreement, 13-14. 
45 See, e.g., Washington Agreement, 16. 
46 See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 29-30. 
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personal vehicle mileage allowances); 47 and paid time off. 48 
Two additional features are worthy of particular note and may help account 
for the frequent support for home health care worker bargaining rights among 
advocacy organizations representing various cohorts of care beneficiaries. Thus, 
common to virtually all of the agreements are provisions that establish training 
support for home care workers, ranging from free-of-charge instruction in first 
aid, CPR, safe-lifting, and nutrition; to reimbursement for tuition and books in 
connection with job-relevant college coursework; to mandatory continuing 
education programs for participation in which workers are paid at their contract 
compensation rates. 49 Home care workers obviously benefit from the resulting 
opportunity to develop and improve their skills, and care recipients benefit from 
the promise of trained caregiving. 
Several of the contracts also establish referral registries to assist home care 
workers in finding placements and care beneficiaries in finding suitable 
caregivers. The details vary, but the picture that emerges falls somewhere between 
a traditional union hiring hall and Angie’s List. The Oregon registry, for example, 
operates as an on-line data-base that can be freely accessed by “customers,” the 
term typically used in these agreements for persons eligible for in-home care in 
connection with a Medicaid-funded, state-run program. On the supply side, a 
would-be caregiver is permitted to post her name, contact information, and 
service profile on the registry so long as she has passed a criminal background 
check and complied with certain orientation, training, and continuing education 
requirements; profiles may be removed for misconduct, poor performance, or a 
violation of pertinent regulations by the caregiver. A “customer” seeking a referral 
simply enters the desired search criteria, and the registry generates a randomized 
list of matching referrals. 50 Washington operates a registry with similar listing 
eligibility and removal features, but a “customer” search generates a referral 
based on seniority or, if the customer identifies special needs or preferences (e.g., 
facility with a particular language), referral of the most senior provider who meets 
 
 
47 See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 24-25; Washington Agreement, 13. 
48 See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 25-27; Washington Agreement, 16. 
49 See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 31-33; Washington Agreement, 21-25. 
50 See Oregon Agreement, 13-16. 
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those needs and preferences. 51 For the home health care worker, then, the 
registry offers a potentially valuable source of work; and, for the “customer,” the 
registry provides reliable source of trained and qualified care-givers. 
Two final features of the collective bargaining agreements, each of them 
common in US labor relations, need mention as well. First, the agreements 
invariably provide grievance procedures that permit the resolution of pay, 
referral, and other disputes via a series of steps of increasing formality and 
culminating in arbitration, appeal to a state employment relations tribunal, or 
some other final dispute resolution mechanism. 52 Second, the agreements provide 
a funding mechanism for the union’s representation activities. Historically, such 
provisions have required payment of a “fair share” fee to the union via automatic 
payroll deduction as a condition of continued employment. 53 The legal 
enforceability of “fair share” agreements has, however, been called into question 
by the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Harris v. Quinn, which will be discussed 
in Part III of the essay, and many bargaining agreements negotiated since that 
decision have made payments to the union voluntary. 54 
3.3.2. Transplanting the model: Organizing family child care workers 
Using the “state as employer” model, bargaining rights have likewise been 
established for a second occupational cohort over the course of the past decade: 
family child care workers who serve in state and federally funded programs 
providing in-home “day care” services for children. Connecticut, 55 Illinois, 56 
Maryland, 57 Massachusetts, 58 Minnesota, 59 New Jersey, 60 New Mexico, 61 New 
 
 
51 See Washington Agreement, 18-20. 
52 See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 16-17; Washington Agreement, 10-12. 
53 See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, at 5, 8. 
54 See, e.g., Washington Agreement, at 6-7. 
55 Conn. Gen Stat. Ann § 17b-705a (West 2013). 
56 5 I.L.C.S. 315/7 (2014). 
57 MD Code, Family Law, § 5-595.3 (2010). 
58 Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 15D § 17 (West 2012). 
59 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179A.52 (West 2013). 
60 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:5B-22.2(a) (West 2010). 
61 N.M.S.A.1978, § 50-4-33 (2009). 
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York, 62 Oregon, 63 Rhode Island, 64 Vermont, 65 and Washington 66 have all taken 
this step, and over 200,000 of these workers are represented by unions (Rhee, 
Zabin, 2009). Again as in the case of home care workers, bargaining rights for 
family child care workers were initially established in several other states and have 
since been withdrawn, a development to which I will return in Part III. 
For present purposes, a detailed picture of the history and contours of 
collective bargaining in family child care would be needlessly duplicative of the 
home care work story, so I will focus here on a handful of key differences 
between the two contexts. First, the individuals in this cohort work in their own 
homes – or in the homes of other providers – rather than in the homes of the 
families whose children they supervise. Moreover, they typically think of 
themselves as self-employed, rather than as employed by others, and frequently 
hire workers of their own. They are often former child care professionals who 
have decided to go into business on their own because they desire more 
workplace autonomy and/or because they need or wish to continue gainful 
employment while staying at home with their own children. They pay dearly for 
that choice, subjecting themselves to a variety of state licensing requirements (e.g., 
re supervision ratios and fire prevention measures) and netting on average 
$7.14/hour with no benefits, which is less than the federal minimum wage of 
$7.25/hour and considerably less than what they would make if they worked at a 
child-care center. Indeed, in states and localities with a higher minimum wage, 
they may earn substantially less per hour than their own employees. (Armenia, 
2015.) 
As with home care, collective bargaining has brought substantial gains to such 
workers. To offer a few illustrations, in Illinois, the initial contract authorized an 
immediate 10% increase in pay rates and an additional 28-to-34.5% increase over 
the ensuing 39 months. Family child care workers in Oregon secured an 18% rate 
increase as well as expanded state subsidies for child care, thus increasing the 
demand for their services. In Washington, the state child care subsidy was 
 
 
62 McKinney’s Labor Law § 695-b (2010). 
63 O.R.S. § 329A.430 (2007). 
64 R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-6.6 (West 2013). 
65 33 V.S.A. § 3602 (2014). 
66 West’s R.C.W.A. 41.56.028 (2007). 
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increased by $45.5 million, and workers additionally secured $750,000 in job 
training subsidies. (Rhee, Zabin, 2009.) The current Connecticut agreement 
provides pay rate increases of 3-to-10% for each of the four years under contract 
and $200,000 per year in professional development funds for training and job-
relevant coursework; it also establishes a working group to explore the feasibility 
of offering subsidized health benefits to covered workers. 67 
4. Evaluating the initiatives 
4.1. Invisible no more 
Given the exclusion of domestic workers from virtually the entire body of 
workplace regulation developed in the twentieth century, the initiatives just 
described are nothing short of extraordinary. The successes in securing wage and 
hour, antidiscrimination, and other protections via legislative and regulatory 
reform are particularly impressive, given the limited political power of low-wage 
working women, most of them of color and/or of extra-national origin. The 
collective-bargaining successes are likewise remarkable, given these demographic 
vulnerabilities as well as the challenge of organizing and representing a workforce 
without a common workplace. The material gains on both fronts – including 
sizeable pay increases and a profusion of benefits – have been considerable. 
Moreover, each of the collective-bargaining successes was enabled by an 
earlier victory either in the state legislature, in the governor’s office, or through a 
popular referendum authorizing the establishment of a bargaining relationship in 
the first place. Taking the wage and hour, Bill of Rights, and collective bargaining 
initiatives together, we are talking about political victories in 26 states – and, in 
nearly half of those, of victories on multiple fronts. In an era of deep legislative 
gridlock at the federal level – and at a time when the US labor movement is 
supposed to be on the ropes – this is a truly impressive record of law reform 
achievement. To be sure, there is a familiar pattern to the dispersion of these 
 
 
67 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Connecticut Office of Early Childhood and 
CSEA-SEIU Local 2001 (The Child Care Union), July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2017, Articles 
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successes, for the 26 states are in the terminology of American political punditry 
overwhelmingly “blue” or “purple,” with only a handful of “red” states in the 
mix. Yet the recent successes of state minimum-wage initiatives in what are now 
reliably “red” states – Alaska, Arkansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota – suggest 
that the plight of the working poor may have more traction with the voting public 
than it does with their elected representatives or other US political elites. 68 
4.2. The considerable advantages of collective bargaining over statutory rights 
Yet the difference between what has thus far been accomplished via statute 
alone and what has been accomplished through collective bargaining is striking. 
Important as they are, the gains made by extending minimum wage and overtime 
protection to domestic workers are modest quite nearly to a fault. For example, 
an individual with two dependents working a forty-hour week at the federal 
minimum wage of $7.25/hour will still make less than the federal poverty 
threshold for a year of work; indeed, even in the US jurisdiction with the highest 
minimum (D.C. at $10.50), she would scarcely exceed that mark. 69 The 
antidiscrimination coverage available to domestic workers – in the half-dozen 
states that have enacted a Bill of Rights for Domestic Workers and thus provide 
them with any antidiscrimination coverage at all – is for the most part limited to 
protection from sexual, racial, and other forms of harassment. This laudable 
achievement addresses one of the most insidious forms of exploitation in the 
domestic work context, but in four of the six jurisdictions it regrettably does not 
include the protection against discrimination in hiring and firing available to the 
vast majority of other American workers. The additional gains secured by the Bill 
of Rights movement – a mandatory “day of rest”; a right to work breaks; a right to 
prepare and eat a meal over the course of the working day; and a right to make 
unmonitored personal calls – are so basic to the material needs and dignitary 
interests of working people that their denial, in the words of Supreme Court 
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Justice Hugo Black, would constitute working conditions “too bad to have to be 
tolerated in a humane and civilized society like ours.” 70 
By contrast, the achievements from collective bargaining are far more 
substantial, typically including pay rates at half again to over twice the federal 
minimum wage, health and safety benefits, transportation allowances, paid days 
off, and substantial investments in job training. Moreover, in terms of enforcing 
those rights – that is to say, when we look at the law in action as opposed to 
what’s merely on the books – the bargaining model likewise offers considerable 
advantages over the statutory alternatives. 
Consider the challenges that abound in securing compliance with wage and 
hour law for those previously excluded by the companionship and live-in 
exemptions. On the public enforcement side, federal and state agencies are 
woefully underfunded and understaffed, particularly in the wake of the 2007 
Recession and resulting cuts in public sector spending. (Ruan, 2012; Rogers, 
2011.) Even in the best of times, agencies will seldom proceed against any but the 
most flagrant and inveterate violators, and the likelihood of an enforcement 
proceeding against a particular third-party provider of home care services – let 
alone an individual or a family in states where the law applies to them – is 
vanishingly small. 
As noted earlier, rights vindication via private lawsuit is available in the form 
of individual claims as well as “collective actions” authorized by the FLSA. To be 
sure, the statute authorizes recovery of unpaid wages as well as liquidated 
damages and reasonable attorneys’fees. But given (1) the low wage rates 
ultimately at stake, (2) the unavailability of punitive damages, and (3) the access-
to-justice challenges faced by most low-wage workers, individual suits are seldom 
economically viable. Collective actions are a more promising vehicle but depend 
on the presence of target employers large enough to make claim aggregation pay, 
and many home care workers are employed by small third-party firms or 
individuals and families. Even in the context of larger firms, there are significant 
procedural hurdles. For one thing, recent Supreme Court decisions have upheld 
employment contracts that require legal claims to be submitted to binding 
arbitration, as well as contract provisions banning class claims in the arbitral 
context. Moreover, the requirement that FLSA claimants “opt in” to collective 
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actions – and the resulting need to track down and persuade potential claimants 
to take this step – may substantially increase litigation costs as well as the 
incentives for resistance, since by opting in a claimant will make his active support 
for the lawsuit known to the employer and thus increase the high and very real 
risk of retaliation. (Ruan, 2012; Boris, Jokela, Undén, 2015.) 
As a result of such impediments to enforcement, documented noncompliance 
with wage and hour law is so common in the US that it even has a name: “wage 
theft” (Rogers 2011). Indeed, survey data in New York suggests that a majority of 
domestic workers were not getting the overtime pay required by that state’s Bill of 
Rights fully two years after enactment (Lerner, 2012). Because the workplace of 
the domestic worker is a private home – rather than a factory or an office – the 
challenge of locating workers and informing them of their rights is a daunting one 
and frequently made more difficult by language and cultural barriers (Semple, 
2011). Surveillance and spot-check techniques that are potentially viable in 
traditional workplace settings would predictably prompt vigorous political 
opposition and might raise privacy issues of a constitutional dimension in the 
home care setting. 
Union representation, on the other hand, is perhaps the most effective means 
of overcoming the enforcement problems that plague the wage-and-hour and Bill 
of Rights approaches. Representation does not stop when the ink is dry on a 
collective agreement but instead continues through the contract term, providing 
workers with an institutional mechanism (a) for keeping them apprised of their 
rights; (b) for policing and correcting individual contract violations through both 
informal and formal grievance procedures; and (c) for identifying patterns of 
difficulty that can be raised in the next round of bargaining or via other collective 
action. In the care work context, the “registry” device may offer a promising 
approach to quick and low-key dispute resolution by offering the prospect of a 
new placement – rather than unemployment together with a long and costly 
lawsuit – when an existing care arrangement founders on the rocks of personality 
clashes or conflicting expectations. 
The benefits that have attended collective bargaining for home care workers 
are typical of those available to employees in the US who are represented by 
unions, but unions – and successful unionization efforts – are increasingly rare in 
the contemporary US economy, so it’s fair to ask how the successes here were 
achieved by what might seem like a most unlikely cohort of workers. One answer 
is that low-wage service work has in general been the bright spot in the otherwise 
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fairly bleak story of the contemporary labor movement. The Justice for Janitors 
campaigns of the 1990s as well as more recent campaigns to organize hospitality 
workers, food and security service employees, poultry processing employees, car 
wash attendants, and home care workers have met with many surprising “against 
the odds” successes. An important reason for this is that such service work 
cannot, at least as yet, be shipped elsewhere – let alone overseas – and accordingly 
employers cannot deploy nor plausibly threaten to deploy what is ordinarily the 
most powerful weapon they have to resist unionization. Care work is likewise, 
again so far, relatively immune to the second best weapon in the employer union-
resistance arsenal – i.e., mechanization. Finally, turning to the organizing 
strategies deployed in the campaigns described here, efforts to develop solidarities 
with the recipients of care – by focusing on the benefits to all concerned of such 
features as enhanced job training and worker-beneficiary matching mechanisms – 
have often if by no means invariably proven successful in removing what would 
otherwise be the most powerful source of potential opposition to bargaining 
rights for home care workers (Boris, Klein, 2015). 
4.3. Second thoughts 
4.3.1. The promise of statutory rights 
That is where this project, as I had originally conceived it, would have ended: 
as further evidence, if further evidence were needed, of the superiority of 
collective bargaining and representation in comparison with enacting and 
enforcing statutory rights as a vehicle for improving the lives of a widely dispersed 
and particularly vulnerable cohort of low-wage workers. But in the process of 
immersing myself in this large and growing body of law and literature, I have 
come to a more nuanced view, at once more concerned about the prospects on 
the ground for collective bargaining and at the same time a bit more sanguine in 
my assessment of the benefits of statutory reform. 
On the latter front, I begin with the observation that it is obviously far too 
early to tell what the wage-and-hour and Bill of Rights initiatives will accomplish, 
since the first Bill of Rights for Domestic Workers was enacted in 2010, and since, 
for most US home care workers, the expansion of wage-and-hour coverage came 
into effect on January 1, 2016. Moreover, though it is an all-too-common rookie 
error among legal scholars to ignore the enforcement dimension of law reform 
proposals and developments – in the familiar taunts of the playground bully who 
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is asked to desist, “Who’s going to make me?” and “You and whose army?” – 
there is a corresponding occupational hazard in blithely assuming that law has no 
effect unless and until the army shows up at the door. Thus, many individual and 
corporate employers of home care and other domestic workers may be expected 
to comply with the terms of these laws once they learn of them, and the public-
education dimension of the campaigns to enact them may well have brought at 
least the existence of the new standards and perhaps the need for them as well to 
fairly widespread attention. Indeed, conformity may be greatest among the 
growing cohort of large third-party firms in the home care industry, since they 
frequently tout their law-compliance services as a major benefit to would-be 
consumers and simply pass along the costs. At the same time, individual states are 
experimenting with promising mechanisms to increase worker awareness of their 
rights and to better enable them to enforce them, from the Wage Theft 
Prevention Statutes already enacted in over a dozen states to Hawaii’s effort to 
provide such assistance to domestic servants via state-contracted non-profit 
immigration resource centers. 
The struggles for enactment and enforcement of statutory rights can likewise 
achieve additional salutary ends in the larger effort – now the subject of its own 
ILO convention – to make domestic service “decent work” (Blackett 2011). For 
one thing, worker centers and grass-roots advocacy organizations (most 
prominently, the National Domestic Workers’Alliance) have been a source of 
robust community building among care workers as well as a powerful engine for 
law reform and enforcement (Boris, Jokela, Undén, 2015; Boris and Klein, 2015; 
Little, 2015). For another, contemporary unions have increasingly touted their 
capacity to secure enforcement of existing statutory rights as an organizing 
strategy among low-wage workers (Fischl, 2007). And for yet another, as 
demonstrated in the late Phyllis Palmer’s pathbreaking exploration of the role of 
the civil rights and women’s liberation movements in post-World War II efforts 
to gain Fair Labor Standards Act inclusion for domestic and agricultural workers, 
“the most important weapon of the weak is their struggle with the powerful over 
meaning and symbols” (Palmer, 1995, p. 417), and the contest over cultural 
meaning – of understanding caregiving as work and of viewing the claims to 
dignity and justice by care workers as every bit as worthy as the claims to dignity 
and justice by those for whom they care – has been energetically engaged in each 
of the law reform efforts described above. 
Finally, it may well be that the greatest virtue of these rights-based initiatives is 
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their staying power; once in place, legally recognized rights seem to be difficult to 
revoke, a feature that distinguishes them from the collective bargaining initiatives, 
and more on that in a moment. 
4.3.2. The limits and perils of bargaining with the state 
Despite the remarkable gains achieved by collective bargaining for home care 
and family child care workers, the promise of this model outside those contexts 
may be limited, for most of the work provided by others in domestic service – 
from nannies and elder-care nurses to cooks and housekeepers – is privately 
funded. To be sure, the strategy of finding common cause with service 
beneficiaries on issues such as worker training and reliable placements might offer 
some possibilities for transplanting the “referral registry” mechanism to the 
private sector setting. An experiment in Oregon – which has recently opened its 
on-line home care referral registry to privately paying consumers – offers 
intriguing possibilities (Boris, Jokela and Undén, 2015), and the resulting 
transparency in the labor market for home care may well provide an avenue for 
“nudging” compliance with wage and hour and other workplace regulations. But 
unlike settings in which the state is paying the tab – thus substantially enhancing 
the prospect of workers and beneficiaries finding common ground on non-wage 
issues – the beneficiaries of privately funded domestic service are paying out of 
pocket, and the antagonism of interests with respect to the basic wage bargain 
may in the end crowd out points of potential mutual interest. 
Even when it is available, collective bargaining “in the shadow of the state” has 
considerable vulnerabilities, as recent political developments have made all too 
clear. Except in the handful of states that adopted it via popular referendum, the 
model depends for its very existence on enabling legislation or executive order, 
and either can be amended or repealed by a subsequent less worker– and union-
friendly legislature or governor. This is precisely what happened in Wisconsin in 
2011, when a newly elected Republican governor and legislative majority 
eliminated pre-existing collective bargaining rights altogether for home health 
care as well as family child care workers as part of a now infamous package of 
anti-union initiatives (Fischl, 2011). It happened again last year in Ohio, when a 
Republican governor rescinded executive orders promulgated by his Democratic 
predecessor establishing collective bargaining rights for the home health care and 
family child care workers in that state (Pelzer, 2015). It has happened as well in 
Kansas, Maine, and Michigan, and there are ominous signs in Illinois, in each case 
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the result of a change in party control of the governor’s office and/or the state 
legislature. 71 This is, as we used to say, not a coincidence. It is of a piece with 
Republican efforts at the state level to eliminate public sector collective 
bargaining altogether, and to defund private sector unions via the enactment of 
“right to work” laws, and these state level efforts may well represent the greatest 
threat to collective bargaining in the US today. The relative immunity of 
referendum-based collective bargaining from such reversals of fortune – together 
with the recent success of minimum wage referenda revealing popular traction for 
the cause of low-wage workers in even the “reddest” of states – suggest that this 
may be an important vehicle for future efforts to secure decent work for care 
workers. 
In the meantime, there is yet another threat to the collective bargaining model, 
this one coming from the federal judiciary. The Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in 
Harris v. Quinn 72 addressed a challenge to the “fair share” provision in a 
collective-bargaining agreement covering home care workers in Illinois, 
denominated “personal assistants” (PAs) in the pertinent state statute. In a 
nutshell, the Court concluded that individual PAs enjoy a First Amendment 
“freedom of association” right to refuse to pay for the benefits they receive from 
union representation. The Court distinguished an earlier decision – Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education 73– which had rejected such a challenge in a case 
involving public (i.e., government) employees, concluding that the PAs in Harris 
were actually the employees of the individual beneficiaries of state-funded care 
and only “partial” or “quasi” but not “full-fledged” public employees. 74 
Subsequent developments suggest that Abood may not long be good law for even 
the fully fledged, 75 and, at least in the public sector, this augurs poorly for the 
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continued viability of the principal means US unions have long employed to fund 
their representation and bargaining activities. 
The Court’s assertion that the PAs were “really” the employees of the elderly, 
disabled, and infirm persons whom they serve through the State’s home care 
rehabilitation program – the “customers,” in the language of the pertinent statute 
– is worth a closer look, for it reveals judicial thinking still very much in the thrall 
of nineteenth-century understandings of the employment relation and thus brings 
us full circle to the legal history of domestic service with which the essay began. 
Thus, a majority of justices focused on the incidents of absolute authority over the 
PAs possessed by the customer, including the final say in deciding whether to 
engage a particular PA, whether and when to terminate the relationship, and how 
the services should proceed in the interim – in other words, the power to hire, 
fire, and direct the course of work. 76 
Responding that the customers and the State were better understood as “joint 
employers” of the PAs, and the PAs thus full-fledged public employees under 
Abood, the dissent described at some length the robust role played by the State 
with respect to each of these incidents of employer power: 
Illinois sets all the workforce-wide terms of employment. Most notably, the State 
determines and pays the employees’wages and benefits, including health insurance 
(while also withholding taxes). By regulation, Illinois establishes the job’s basic 
qualifications: for example, the assistant must provide references or recommendations 
and have adequate experience and training for the services given. So too, the State 
describes the services any personal assistant may provide, and prescribes the terms of 
standard employment contracts entered into between personal assistants and 
customers. Illinois as well structures the individual relationship between the customer 
and his assistant … Along with both the customer and his physician, a state-employed 
counselor develops a service plan laying out the assistant’s specific job responsibilities, 
hours, and working conditions. That counselor also assists the customer in conducting 
a state-mandated annual performance review, based on state-established criteria, and 
mediates any resulting disagreements. . . 
Before a customer may hire an assistant, the counselor must sign off on the 
employee’s ability to follow the customer’s directions and communicate with him. And 
although only a customer can actually fire an assistant, the State can effectively do so 
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by … withhold[ing] payment from an assistant (or altogether disqualify[ing] her from 
the program) based on credible allegations of customer abuse, neglect, or financial 
exploitation. 77 
It is a not uncommon experience in reading US judicial opinions to find 
oneself tempted to conclude that the majority and the dissent are talking about 
two entirely different cases, but in Harris the differing perspectives reveal much 
about the majority’s understanding of the employment relation. Consider the 
state-employed counselor, who in the dissent’s recounting plays a significant role 
in hiring and assessing the qualifications of a PA, in the development of a “service 
plan” that specifies the responsibilities, hours, and working conditions of the PA, 
and in the mandatory annual evaluation of a PA’s work. Yet the counselor’s 
existence does not even merit mention in the majority opinion until the final 
sentence of the five-paragraph passage devoted to its description of the 
PA/customer relationship. 78 Instead, the customer seems to be alone at the wheel 
because of the right to have a final say at the critical moments, and it is certainly 
true that a PA will not be hired, a “service plan” will not go into effect, and a 
disfavored PA will not be retained in a placement unless the customer agrees. 
Thus, in the majority’s view, the customer is the employer because real employers 
possess such absolute authority over their charges. By contrast, the State’s role in 
the relationship is dialogic and one of shared governance; it merely “assists,” 
“suggests,” “helps,” and “mediates” the customer’s decision-making via the 
Counselor Who Must Not Be Named, and pay no attention to the man behind 
the curtain who established the home care program, defined its parameters, and is 
footing the bill. Speaking of footing the bill, this authoritarian understanding of 
the employment relation would also go a long way to account for the otherwise 
inexplicable erasure in the majority opinion of the health insurance benefits 
enjoyed by the PAs. Those benefits were the product of collective bargaining with 
the PAs’union rather than of the legislation providing such benefits to the rest of 
the State’s workforce – that is, the product of shared governance rather than 
sovereign command – and thus they just did not count in the majority’s 
assessment of the State’s putative status as an employer. 
The State is not the only party given short shrift in the majority’s framing of 
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the case. The entire legal structure of home care provision in Illinois, and in the 
other states that have adopted the “bargaining in the shadow of the state” model, 
is the product of over a quarter century of struggles by and between home care 
workers, unions, and worker centers seeking to make home care decent work; 
disabled and aged persons and the advocacy organizations that represent them 
seeking to enhance the availability and quality of care; and public officials 
pursuing a mix of cost-containment and constituent service goals. As the Harris 
dissent put it: 
Workforce shortages and high turnover have long plagued in-home care programs, 
principally because of low wages and benefits. That labor instability lessens the quality 
of care, which in turn, forces disabled persons into institutions and (massively) 
increases costs to the State. The individual customers are powerless to address those 
systemic issues; rather, the State—because of its control over workforce-wide terms of 
employment—is the single employer that can do so. And here Illinois determined (as 
have nine other States) that negotiations with an exclusive representative offered the 
best chance to set the Rehabilitation Program on firmer footing. Because of that 
bargaining, … home-care assistants have nearly doubled their wages in less than 10 
years, obtained state-funded health insurance, and benefited from better training and 
workplace safety measures. The State, in return, has obtained guarantees against 
strikes or other work stoppages—and most important, believes it has gotten a more 
stable workforce providing higher quality care, thereby avoiding the costs associated 
with institutionalization. 79 
Yet even this account leaves out an important dimension of how the 
collective bargaining model developed. The designation of the recipients of 
home care as “customers” with considerable control over PAs and their work 
had its genesis in California – the state that originated this model – and grew 
out of the efforts of the “independent living” movement among disabled 
persons seeking to wrest control from medical professionals who too often 
treated them as patients to be managed rather than as self-actualizing 
individuals who “best understood their [own] needs and how to meet them.” 
Independent living centers ultimately played a crucial role in the effort to 
persuade the California legislature to extend collective bargaining rights to 
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home care workers by creating county-level public authorities with whom they 
could bargain, agreeing that this would promote higher quality care but 
insisting as part of the package that the beneficiaries of care “would retain 
consumer control over the authorities and retain the right to hire, fire, and 
direct their attendants.” (Boris, Klein, 2015, p. 102, 196.) 
The legislation that emerged – and has served as a basic template for one of 
the most promising innovations in modern labor law – thus empowered home 
care workers by giving them a seat at the bargaining table and the individuals with 
whom they work by giving due regard to their considerable interest in controlling 
the delivery of their own care. As Harris confirms, jurists who still view the 
employment relation through nineteenth-century lenses are likely to mistake the 
latter for simply another instance of master-meets-obedient-servant and to have 
no idea at all of what to make of the former. 
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Appendix I: State-By-State Treatment of Domestic Servants and 
























































































* The author gratefully acknowledges the extensive assistance of Anne Rajotte, 
Research Librarian at the University of Connecticut School of Law, in developing this 
Appendix. 
1 “Express” means the statute provided for broad coverage and imposed an “express” 
(i.e., specific) exclusion for domestic servants. “Negative Implication” means the statute 
covered only specified groups of workers (most commonly, those in a listed series of 
“inherently dangerous jobs”) that did not include domestic servants. 
2 Except in the cases of Vermont and Delaware – where the WC statutes contained 
express exclusions for domestic servants but no exclusion for agricultural workers – every 
other state treated agricultural workers in the same manner as domestic servants (i.e., 
express exclusion; exclusion by negative implication; or no exclusion at all). 
3 In 1913, New York passed an amended version of the statute, which provided for 
broad coverage but specifically excluded domestic servants and agricultural workers. 1913 
N.Y. Laws 2277, § 3(4). 
















































































































4 Ohio and Connecticut limited the coverage of their statutes to employers with five or 
more employees, thus excluding domestic servants, agricultural workers, and everyone else 
working for smaller employers. 
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Appendix II: Unemployment Insurance Statutes Enacted before 
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